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French philosophers have written widely on contemporary European problems, but their work has
often had limited impact in the English-speaking world. Tom Angier highlights the contribution of
Pierre Manent in capturing the challenges at the heart of the integration process, as well as the
need for social democrats to rehabilitate and reinvigorate the idea of nationhood if they are to see
off competition from the far left and far right.
French Philosophy has a bad reputation among Anglophone ‘analytic’ philosophers. The mere
mention of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Louis Althusser or Alain Badiou is
enough to elicit scorn and derision. They have become a by-word for imprecise, sloppy argument, combined with
fanciful, showman-like rhetoric. The fairness of this judgement is uncertain, especially since it is made often on the
basis of mere hearsay.
What is certain, however, is that other, indisputably sober and rigorous French philosophers remain almost
completely unknown by les philosophes anglo-saxons. Names like Chantal Delsol, Pierre Manent, Pierre
Rosanvallon, Rémi Brague and Nicolas Grimaldi are still wholly peripheral, even in political philosophy, where they
have made seminal contributions. And this is lamentable particularly at present, since several of them have been far
more clear-eyed about the deep instabilities of the EU project than their (generically more ‘Eurosceptic’) Anglophone
counterparts. I shall concentrate on the case of Pierre Manent.
Ten years ago, Manent published Democracy Without Nations: The Fate of
Self-Government in Europe. This short yet profound book recapitulates an
essay he wrote back in 1996 (the same year that Tony Judt – himself a
scholar of French intellectual history – published A Grand Illusion?, which
strongly questioned the viability of the post-expansion EU). Manent’s
argument is relatively straightforward: the EU has become a mode of rule
(kratos) that has become detached from, and increasingly disdainful of, its
component peoples (demoi). This can be seen primarily in the heedless
imposition of various European Treaties, despite democratic opposition, and
more generally in a project of integration that has not captured the political
and cultural imaginations of those it is meant to integrate.
This development has deep roots in the devastation of post-war Europe,
where – in face of the Fascist idolatry of the nation, and the Communist
idolatry of class – significant numbers of the bien pensant came to view
both nations and classes as social forms to be steadily overcome. But as
Manent contends, even if this project managed to gain the consent of the
majority – or at least their grudging acquiescence, especially during the
years of widespread prosperity and growth – its fundamental impatience
with the mediating form of nationhood contained perils of its own.
The perils in question lay centrally in hoping for the democratic consent of
the governed, while simultaneously eroding the main historical source of what Manent calls social ‘communion’. For
it is principally the nation that, since the nineteenth century, has been the political focal point of identity, loyalty and
accountability in Europe. Insofar as the EU has sought to shift these foci to other, supranational institutions and
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imperatives, it has embarked on an unprecedented project, one that is unparalleled, indeed, anywhere else in the
world.
In short, below each nation lies ‘civil society’, which remains politically and economically an insufficient object of
aspiration; above each nation lies a putative ‘great, enormous European nation’, of indeterminate boundaries and
without historical or cultural ballast. Between these sub- and supranational poles the EU finds itself without real
moorings, refusing, as Manent puts it, to ‘define itself politically’, and hence taking on the character of ‘an imperious,
indefinite, and opaque movement’.
He does not mince his words: the post-Maastricht EU is effectively ‘de-politicised’ or politically ‘vacuous’. Granted, it
has retained the democratic principle of consent – which up till now has ‘used the nation as an instrument or vehicle’
– but has progressively sidelined the latter as an ‘antiquated political form’. In its place we have rhetorically
impressive ends – peace, human rights, no borders, a universal humanity – but no politically tangible, culturally
convincing or economically fair means of achieving them.
Most contemporary social democrats will respond to this critique with indignation. Is the EU really in tension with its
constituent nations to the degree Manent maintains? What is wrong with ‘pooling national sovereignty’ to some
extent? Surely the ends proposed by the EU are so transparently just that we should tolerate some ambiguities in its
developing mode of governance?
But none of these responses faces up to Manent’s fundamental challenge. That is: the EU has been (at best)
lukewarm to the traditional conception of nationhood, while simultaneously failing to create any locus of political
interest and loyalty that is (even vaguely) comparable to it. The notion that pooling sovereignty is essentially an
administrative matter is mere ideological pretence so long as the EU is made up of nations, rather than provinces –
nations, moreover, which privilege their own interests at every major turn.
The notion, furthermore, that the EU’s ends are the epitome of justice remains a mere bureaucratic piety in face of
nations (like Poland and Hungary) that repudiate many of them as anathema, or nations like Greece, which are at
risk of economic collapse. In other words, whatever the exaggerations or lacunae in Manent’s account, on the core
issue he appears highly prescient: the EU’s dream of ‘ever closer union’ between the nations of Europe has been
gradually confounded by political, cultural and economic realities.
Manent does consider an alternative to this dream, one that is far more modest in its terms, and even enjoys some
popularity (especially among ‘post-modern’ theorists). That is, the EU as benevolent host to a ‘multiplicity of
identities’, ‘communicating’ with one another as equals yet remaining basically distinct. But this consummately
abstract vision falls short just where the maximalist dream is guilty of dramatic overreach. For it offers in principle no
territorial limits to the expansion of the EU, and avoids the pressing question of just what identities the bloc can
realistically accommodate.
As Manent adjures, ‘“Communication”, in itself, does not create a true bond among people’, and the ‘popular term
identity is a terribly impoverished substitute for the older term community’. Once again, we come up against the
stubborn need for, yet inability to create, a supra-national locus of political deliberation and belonging which can
inspire genuine loyalty and solidarity.
Not that the nation is without flaws of its own: it struggles to contain divergent interests, and has lost much of its
imaginative resonance over the last five decades or so. But in a Europe where almost all previous sources of (pace
Manent) ‘identity’ have been radically hollowed out – religion, class, region, sex role, trade union membership,
political affiliation, etc. – the nation is, in effect, the last man standing. Only it combines efficient (and approximately
just) administrative and economic functioning with the cultural capital needed to inspire long-term dedication and
even sacrifice.
The upshot of all this is that social democrats must rehabilitate and reinvigorate the idea of nationhood. Whereas the
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EU has manifestly failed to construct a sense of belonging to and participating in a shared project, one with the
requisite practical and cultural depth, European nations still – despite manifold weaknesses – command such a
sense. As Manent puts matters, they combine democracy with the vital feeling of having a ‘body’.
More to the point, if social democrats do not rise to this challenge, they will be completely ousted by the likes of
Wilders, Le Pen, Salvini and Åkesson. The latter’s conception of the nation as centred on ethnicity, and on traditions
that are largely impenetrable to newcomers, already hold immediate appeal for those who feel disaffected and
bewildered by the disembodied political and economic rationalism of the EU.
But pride in and dedication to the nation need not exclude social and economic justice – indeed, they can be their
vehicle. While this fact was obscured by the aberration of Fascism, Fascism was precisely that: an aberration.
Deeper and far longer-standing European traditions – Judaeo-Christian, Greek and Roman – have always
understood the nation as mediating the particular and the universal, rather than simply hallowing different forms of
particularity. In sum, we should both affirm and act on Manent’s resounding conclusion: ‘The nation remains the
indispensable form that gives concrete expression to our common human nature and aspirations’.
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